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NOTES
THE RESULT WHEN ONE OF TWO ALTERNATIVE CONTINGENT
REMAINDERS IS VOID
INTRODUCTION
Under the rule against perpetuities, a limitation is void unless
it is certain that the estate will vest, if it is ever to vest at all,
within the period required by the rule. If there is any possibility
that the event upon which the estate is limited may occur after
that time, the limitation is too remote. However, a devise is
sometimes limited to take effect upon the happening of either of
two alternative contingencies. One of these may be such that it
could occur subsequent to the period of time allowed by the rule
against perpetuities, although the other is one which must occur
within that period, if it is to occur at all. It is the purpose of this
note to consider under what circumstances such alternative con-
tingencies are separable and to discover the effect of the in-
validity of one provision upon the validity of the other.
ALTERNATIVE CONTINGENT REMAINDERS
Although it is well established that a remainder cannot be
limited after a fee, estates may be limited so that the remainder
will go to one of two persons upon the occurrence of a certain
contingency. These future estates are called alternative remain-
ders or remainders with a double aspect.' If through the happen-
ing of the requisite condition, the first remainder vests, the other
remainder fails entirely. The second remainder vests only if the
first fails. In order for the second remainder to be valid, both
alternative remainders must be contingentz The second remain-
1. In the vast majority of the cases, the alternative remainders are
remainders in fee; however, they could also be valid alternative remainders
in fee tail or for life.
2. In the leading case of Luddington v. Kime, 1 Ld. Raym. 203, 91 Eng.
Rep. 1031 (1697), there was a devise to A for life, remainder to his male
issue in fee simple, remainder over to B if A should die without male
issue. These remainders were alternative, and only one could vest. The
vesting of one and the defeat of the other were to take place at the death
of A. If the remainder to B had been limited upon a different contingency
which would have caused vesting at a later time, or if the limitation to
A's issue had been vested, the remainder to B would have been a remainder
limited after a fee.
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der is necessarily contingent, and if the first is vested, the second
could take effect only by defeating or destroying the first. The
first remainder's being vested would make the second a re-
mainder limited after a fee, and thus void as a common law
remainder, although good as an executory limitation.3 Accord-
ingly, the great weight of American authority is to the effect
that when there are limitations in the alternative and the first
is to an ascertained person and in form unconditional, followed
by a condition subsequent in form, the first limitation is a vested
remainder and the second is an executory interest.'
On the other hand, limitations in the alternative with a condi-
tion precedent in form attached are construed by many courts as
contingent remainders in the alternative,5 in accordance with
Luddington v. Kime. However, even in such circumstances some
courts regard the first limitation as a vested remainder, if at all
possible, because of the tendency to construe remainders as
vested rather than contingent., In so doing, the courts disregard
the fact that the condition is precedent in form and hold that it is
3. Beckley v. Leffingwell, 57 Conn. 163 (1888); Mercantile Bank of
New York v. Ballard's Assignee, 83 Ky. 481 (1885); Yocum v. Siler, 160
Mo. 281, 61 S.W. 208 .(1901) ; Green v. Head, 54 Misc. 454, 104 N.Y. Supp.
383 (Sup. Ct. 1907); Taylor v. Taylor, 63 Pa. 481 (1870); Doe d. Herbert
v. Selby, 2 B. & C. 926, 107 Eng. Rep. 626 (1824); Goodright d. Docking,
v. Dunham, 1 Doug. 264, 99 Eng. Rep. 173 (1779); Luddington v. Kime, 1
Ld. Raym. 203, 91 Eng. Rep. 1031 (1697).
4. Sumpter v. Carter, 115 Ga. 893, 42 S.E. 324 (1902); Hudgens v.
Wilkins, 77 Ga. 555 (1886); Bailey v. Strahan, 314 11. 213, 145 N.E. 359
(1924) ; Calvert v. Calvert, 297 Ill. 22, 130 N.E. 347 (1921) ; Strickland v.
Strickland, 271 Ill. 614, 111 N.E. 592 (1916); Northern Trust Co. v.
Wheaton, 249 Ill. 606, 94 N.E. 980 (1911); Taylor v. Stephens, 165 Ind.
200, 74 N.E. 980 (1905); Callison v. Morris, 123 Iowa 297, 98 N.W. 780
(1904); Mercantile Bank of New York v. Ballard's Assignee, 83 Ky. 481(1885); Wilson v. Pichon, 162 Md. 199, 159 At]. 766 (1932); Blanchard
v. Blanchard, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 223 (1861); Howell v. Gifford, 64 N.J.
Eq. 180, 53 Atl. 1074 (Ch. 1903); Ziegler v. Love, 185 N.C. 40, 115 S.E.
887 (1923); Walker v. Alverson, 87 S.C. 55, 68 S.E. 966 (1910); Rutledge
v. Fishburne, 66 S.C. 155, 44 S.E. 564 (1903); Haynsworth v. Haynsworth,
12 Rich. Eq. 114 (S.C. 1860).
5. Smith v. Chester, 272 Ill. 428, 112 N.E. 325 (1916); Dickey v.
Citizen's State Bank of Fairmont, 180 N.E. 36 (Ind. App. 1932); Webber
v. Jones, 94 ,Me. 429, 47 AtI. 903 (1900); Lewis v. Payne, 113 Md. 127, 77
Atl. 321 (1910); Lambertson v. Case, 245 Mich. 208, 228 N.W. 182 (1928);
May v. May, 209 App. Div. 22, 204 N.Y. Supp. 408 (2nd Dept. 1924);
McCreary v. Coggeshall, 74 S.C. 42, 53 S.E. 978 (1906); In re Field's
Estate, 101 Vt. 242, 143 At]. 280 (1928).
6. Bowman v. Long, 123 Ga. 242 (1857); Cockey v. Cockey, 141 Md. 373
118 Atl. 850 (1922); Schockley v. Homer, 87 Neb. 146, 127 N.W. 145
(1910); Seabrook v. Gregg, 2 S.C. 68 (1870); Rivers v. Tripp, 4 Rich. Eq.
276 (S.C. 1852).
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in fact subsequent. Nevertheless, the court's finding that the first
limitation is to unascertained persons will aways make the re-
mainders contingent.7
THE GENERAL RULE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
In instances where an estate is limited on alternative contin-
gencies, one within and one beyond the period allowed by the rule
against perpetuities, courts have almost uniformly held that the
invalidity of one provision does not affect the validity of the
other. However, many courts have used language to the effect
that in the aforementioned circumstances the validity of the pro-
vision not void for remoteness depends upon the happening of
the event," i.e., whether the contingency does happen which is not
invalid for remoteness. This language of the courts about the
happening of the event leads to some possibility of confusion
about whether the validity of the contingency not void for re-
moteness may be determined prior to the happening of the event
-at the time of the testator's death rather than at the termina-
tion of the prior estate, for example. This language results from
a confusion of two problems: first, the validity of the limitation;
second, whether the gift will vest. The limitation upon the valid
contingency is valid from the effective date of the will, although
it must await the occurrence of the condition precedent to its
vesting, like every other contingent limitation, and possibly may
never vest.
Illustrative of this confusion of language is the statement of
the rule made in Jackson v. Phillips9 by Gray, J.:
But if the testator distinctly makes his gift over to depend
upon what is sometimes called an alternative contingency, or
upon either of two contingencies, one of which may be too
remote and the other cannot be, its validity depends upon
the event....
7. Friedman v. Friedman, 283 Ill. 383, 119 N.E. 321 (1918); Ruddefl v.
Wren, 208 Ill. 508, 70 N.E. 751 (1904); Wunderlich v. Bleyle, 96 N.J. Eq.
135, 125 Atl. 386 (Ch. 1924); Whitesides v. Cooper, 115 N.C. 570, 20 S.E.
295 (1894) ; In re Long's Estate, 225 Pa. 39, 73 Atl. 981 (1909); Allison
v. Allison's Executors, 101 Va. 53-7, 44 S.E. 904 (1903).
8. Monarski v. Greb 407 I1. 281, 95 N.E.2d 433 (1950); Springfield
Safe Deposit & Trust Zo. v. Ireland, 167 N.E. 261 (Mass. 1929); Jackson
v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867); Brookover v. Grimm, 118
W. Va. 227, 190 S.E. 697 (1937) ; In re Davies & Kent's Contract, 2 Ch. 35(1910).
9. 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867).
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The case of Quinlan v. Wickman 0 illustrates why the language
in the aforementioned case is somewhat misleading. This case
involved a will which bequeathed trust money in the hands of the
trustee to the testatrix' daughter on two contingencies, one de-
pending on the death of another daughter without leaving any
children, and the other depending on the death of the last sur-
viving-child of such daughter before any of her children reached
the age of thirty years. The plaintiffs alleged that the will, in
attempting to dispose of the property in trust, was violative of
the rule against perpetuities and thus an ineffective devise. They
claimed that upon the death of the testatrix her four children,
her only heirs at law, became seised in fee, as tenants in com-
mon. However, the court held that the first limitation was law-
ful even though the second was invalid for remoteness. Accord-
ingly, when the court said that the gift "will take effect or not
according to the event," the court referred to the vesting of the
gift and not to its validity. The gift upon the valid contingency
is valid from the effective date of the will, even though its vest-
ing depends upon t.he happening of the condition precedent to
its vesting. Moreover, there is the possibility that the event will
never happen, and, if it, does not, the remainder will simply fail
like any other contingent remainder.
ENGLISH PRECEDENTS
When the gift was made on two contingencies, stated in the
alternative, the earliest English cases that dealt with the question
treated it as two gifts for purposes of the rule against perpetui-
ties, and one contingency was held valid and the other invalid.
These earlier decisions properly tended to construe the gifts
separately; when it could be done.','
A leading English case on this question of alternative contin-
gent limitations and a good example of the application of this
rule was Goring v. Howard. 112 Personal property was given to
trustees to hold to A for life, and after his death to his children
10. 233 I1. 39 84 N.E. 3S (1908).
11. Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mar. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (1817); Crompe v.
Barrow, 4 Ves, 681, 31 Eng. Rep. 351 (1799); Porter v. Bradley, 3 T.R.
143, 100 Eng. Rep. 500 (1789); Marsh v. Marsh, 1 Bro. C.C. 293, 28 Eng.
Rep. 1140 (1783) ; Longhead v. Phelps, 2 Black. W. 704, 96 Eng. Rep. 414(1770).
12. 16 Sim. 395, 60 Eng. Rep. 926 (1848).
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on their reaching twenty-five, and in case none of A's sons
reached twenty-five or if A died without issue living at his death,
then over. Although the gift limited on A's son's not reaching
twenty-five was clearly void, the gift over on A's dying without
issue at his death was held good. Here the whole gift was not
void for remoteness. The contingencies in this case were separa-
ble. Upon the happening of the valid contingency-A's dying
without issue-the gift over took effect.
Other English cases with analogous factual situations have
said the rule is clearly settled that when one of two alternative
contingent limitations is too remote, and the other is capable of
taking effect, the court will simply disregard the invalid limita-
tion. s
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE BY AMERICAN DECISIONS
Although the problem was discussed in a dictum to Dunlap v.
Dunlap,1' the first American case dealing directly with the prob-
lem was Armstrong v. Armstrong25 The latter case involved a
gift by will to A for life, and after his death to his children, but
in case A die without issue at the time of his death or such issue
themselves die without issue, then over. It happened that the de-
visee did die without leaving issue at his death. The court here
set out the rule that,
Where a limitation is made to take effect on two alternative
events or contingencies with a double aspect, one of which is
too remote, and the other valid, as being within the pre-
scribed limits, although it is void so far as it depends upon
the remote event, it will be allowed to take effect on the alter-
native one."
Since the first event, i.e., the death of A without issue, must nec-
essarily have happened, if at all, within the prescribed period,
the gift over was clearly valid, and would vest when that event
happened. If, however, the first taker had died leaving issue, the
gift over would have failed since the second event-the death of
13. Bullock v. Bullock 1 Ch. 493 (1915); In re Davies & Kent's Con-
tract, 2 Ch. 35 (1910); i Re Bowles, 1 Ch. 371 (1905); Goodier v. John-
son, 18 Ch. D. 441 (1881); Miles v. Harford, 12 Ch. D. 691 (1879);
Cambridge v. Rous, 25 Beav. 409, 414, 53 Eng. Rep. 693, 756 (1858);
Goring v. Howard, 16 Sim. 395, 60 Eng. Rep. 926 (1848); Minter v.
Wraith, 13 Sim. 52, 60 Eng. Rep. 21 (1842).
14. 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Desauss.) 305 (1812).
15. 53 Ky. (14 Monroe) 333 (1854).
16. Id. at 346.
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such issue without issue-was one that might not have happened
within the prescribed limits of the rule against perpetuities.
Soon afterward, other American cases arose in which the tes-
tator had provided for limitations based on alternative contin-
gencies. In these, the testators themselves had separated the
events so as to make the gift over take effect on the happening of
either Qf two events. The courts then had no difficulty allowing
the valid alternative limitation to stand.17 Typical of the results
achieved in the great majority of the cases was the holding in
Jackson v. Phitips.2 There the court concluded:
But if the testator distinctly makes his gift over to depend
upon what is sometimes called an alternative contingency, or
upon either of two contingencies, one of which may be too
remote and the other cannot be, its validity depends upon
the event; or, in other words, if he gives the estate over on
one contingency which must happen, if at all, within the
limit of the rule, and that contingency does happen, the va-
lidity of the distinct gift over in that event will not be af-
fected by the consideration that upon a different contin-
gency which might or might not happen within the lawful
limit, he makes a disposition of his estate, which would be
void for remoteness.29
The rule was again recognized in the leading case of Moroney
v. Haas,20 where there was a devise of income in trust to A for
life, and then to her children or their issue until her youngest
child was twenty years of age, when the devised property was to
be divided among the living issue. However, in case A left no
children or issue of a deceased child surviving her, or in case no
surviving child attained the age of twenty-five years and all
should die without issue, the property held in trust was to go
over. Applying the aforementioned rule, the Supreme Court of
Illinois held that, the former, valid provision was separable from
and not affected by the latter, invalid one and could thus be given
effect.
17. Perkins v. Fisher, 59 Fed. 801 (4th Cir. 1894); Halsey v. Goddard,
86 Fed.'25 (C.C.D.R.I. 1898); Attorney General v. Wallace's Devisees, 46
Ky. (7 Monroe) 611 (1847); Seaver v. Fitzgerald, 141 Mlass. 401, 6 N.E.
73 (1885); Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867); Acker-
man's Administrators V. Vreeland's Executor, 14 N.J. Eq. 23 (1861);
Schettler v. Smith, 2 Hand 328 (N.Y. 1869); Fowler v. Depau, 26 Barb.
224 (N.Y. 1857).
18; 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867).
19. Id. at 572.
20. 277 IIl. 467, 115 N.E. 648 (1917).
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In Re Trevor 21 the New York Court of Appeals rather dra-
matically explained the operation and purpose of the doctrine
previously discussed:
The will is to be read in the light of what has happened, not
so much for the purpose of determining its validity as for
the purpose of seeing clearly by such light what is possible
in the way of separating the good from the bad. In thus con-
struing the will, the court does not perform a radical opera-
tion to remove a malignant growth when either the disease
or the operation will take the life out of the testamentary
document. The irritation of invalidity has produced not a
cancer, but, at worst, an epidermal callosity which may be
harmlessly eliminated. A pencil may be drawn through the
objectionable alternative provisions of the will which post-
pone vesting beyond the end of a second life. A perfectly
good and workable will remains.2
The case of Springfield Safe Deposit and Trust Co. V. Ireland
presents a most unusual factual situation. Here the testator es-
tablished by a will, dated May 17, 1881, a trust of all his estate,
the net income to go to his only child, A, for life. At A's death
the income was to go in equal shares to her children then living,
the lawful issue of any child then deceased to take his parent's
share by representation. In the month of January, 1922, or if A
had not died by that time in the first January after the death of
A, the principal was to go to her then living children and the
lawful issue of any of her deceased children as tenants in com-
mon. However, if none of her children or grandchildren were
alive at that time, then over. The testator thus had undertaken
to provide for any other children that A might possibly have.
The testator died in 1891. When A died in 1928, she left sur-
viving her only one son, who was born before the death of the
testator.
It may be seen that the remainder was to vest in the month of
January, 1922 in case A was dead; however, if A lived beyond
January, 1922, then the estate would vest in the first January
after her decease, a period not more than twelve months from the
death of A. In effect, the gift over would thus vest within a life
or lives in being and twelve months at the latest and would not
be too remote. It must be noted, however, that the limitation
21. 239 N.Y. 6, 145 N.E. 66, reargument denied without opinion, 239
N.Y. 579, 147 N.E. 203 (1924).
22. Id. at 18, 145 N.E. at 69.
23. 167 N.E. 261 (Mass. 1929).
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which vests the estate at the earlier period, January, 1922, is
held invalid as a violation of the rule against perpetuities.24 This
rule, which was created to prevent remoteness in vesting, thus
operates in this case so that the limitation which in point of time
vests the estate at an earlier period is void for remoteness. 23 In
contrast, cases considered thus far held the alternative contin-
gency vesting the estate at the earlier period to be valid and the
limitation vesting the estate at the more remote period to be in-
valid because of remoteness. Also, this case is important because
it demonstrates that where an estate is limited on alternative
contingencies, one within and one beyond the period allowed by
the rule for the vesting of estates, the rule that holds that the
valid one not to be voided by the invalid one applies not only to
alternative contingent remainders but also applies to a subse-
quent limitation that takes effect by cutting off a prior one, i.e.,
an executory limitation. In the instant ease, the limitation over
took effect as a springing executory devise, since, upon the death
of the life tenant, her heir had to wait until the January there-
after when the legal title in fee vested in him and the trust
discharged.2 8
The rule has had general application in this country. The bulk
of the later American cases, as well as the earlier ones con-
sidered, have uniformly held that contingencies may be split s6
as to give effect to the valid one when the testator himself sepa-
rates the limitation to take effect on the happening of either of
two events.27 The very few cases that have held otherwise seem
24. A limitation violates the rule against perpetuities unless it is certain
at the time of the death of the testator that the estate will vest within
the period required by the rule. If, by any possibility, the event upon which
the estate is limited may occur after that time, the limitation is too remote.
In the instant case, there was a possibility that A might give birth to a
child soon after the testator's death. A and her first son might then have
died soon after the death of the testator in 1891. If their deaths had
occurred before January 1901 and the child born after the testator's death
lived until January, 1922, the interest of this child would not have vested
within 21 years after a life or lives in being at the death of the testator.
Thus, that limitation is void because of the possibility of vesting at too
remote a time.
25. Comment, 10 B.U.L. REv. 256, 257 (1930).
26. Id. at 261.
27. In re Sahlender's Estate, 201 P.2d 69, 89 Cal. App.2d 329 (1948);
In re Heard's Estate, 146 P.2d 725 (Cal. App. 1944), aff'd 25 Cal.2d 322,
153 P.2d 553 (1944); Congregational Home Missionary Society v. Thames
Bank & Trust Co. of Norwich, 127 Conn. 1, 14 A.2d 626 (1940); Comstock
v. Bridgeport Trust Co., 106 Conn. 514, 138 Atl. 440 (1927); Brooks Bank
& Trust Co. v. Beers, 120 Conn. 477, 181 At. 391 (1935); Thresher'm
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to be erroneous decisions in which the courts failed to separate
provisions which were clearly separable.28
CONSIDERATIONS THAT AFFECT THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE
Important considerations in determining whether the valid al-
ternative contingent limitation or valid alternative provision of
a trust can be separated from the invalid and prevent the whole
from being cut down are: whether the invalid provision is such
an integral part of a general scheme that a separation would
destroy the testator's intent that these dispositions be a part of
the whole,29 and whether or not a separation would result in an
unjust distribution of the estate.30 In applying these rules, the
court does not discover and effectuate the intent of the testator
but actually carries out within the law what he presumably would
have wished in a situation he never contemplated.31 Thus, courts
have reasoned that the valid provision will be upheld only if the
valid alternative limitations can be separated from the invalid
ones and be given effect without doing violence to the intention
Appeal, 74 Conn. 40, 49 Atl. 861 (1901); Monarsld v. Greb, 407 Ill. 281,
95 N.E.2d 433 (1950); Quinlan v. Wickman, 233 Ill. 39, 84 N.E. 38
(1908); Springfield Safe Denosit & Trust Co. v. Ireland, 268 Mass. 62,
167 N.E. 261 (1929); Brown v. Wright, 194 Mass. 540, 80 N.E. 612 (1907);
Stone v. Bradlee, 183 Mass. 165, 66 N.E. 708 (1903); Gettins v. Grand
Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930); In re Johnson's
Will, 233 App. Div. 55, 253 N.Y. Supp. 241 (4th Dept. 1931) ; In To Trevor,
239 N.Y. 6, 145 N.E 66 Teargument denied without opinion, 239 N.Y. 579,
147 N.E. 203 (1924); In re Schwamm's Estate, 53 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Surr.
Ct. 1945); In re Horton's Will, 175 Misc. 542, 24 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Surr. Ct.
1940); In re Chamber's Will, 167 Misc. 843; 4 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Surr. Ct.
1938); In re Von Deilen's Will, 154 Misc. 877, 278 N.Y. Supp. 689 (Surr.
Ct. 1935); In re Bernuth, 127 Misc. 705 217 N.Y. Supp. 633 (Surr. Ct.
1926); In re Griscom's Estate, 333 Pa. 422, 9 A.2d 344 (1939); In re Whit-
man's Estate, 248 Pa. 285, 93 Atl. 1062 (1915); Brookover v. Grimm, 118
W. Va. 227, 190 S.E. 697 (1937).
28. In Donohue v. McNichol, 61 Pa. 73 (1869), the court, by way of
dicta, erroneously failed to separate clearly distinct alternative limitations
and indicated that the valid provisions also would be void for remoteness.
In Brooker v. Brooker, 130 Tex. 27, 106 S.W.2d 247 (1937), the court
failed to separate provisions that were clearly separable. McCreery v.
Johnston, 90 W. Va. 80, 110 S.E. 464 (1922) involved a situation where
there were two separate gifts over, one of which was too remote. The
court on dubious authority held both gifts over invalid on the ground that
the testator would have wished both gifts or neither to take effect
29. Rong v. Hailer, 109 Minn. 191, 123 N.W. 471 (1909); Tilden v.
Green, 130 N.Y. 29, 50, 28 N.E. 880, 883 (1891); Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa.
143, 116 Atl. 392 (1922).
30. Lepard v. Clapp, 80 Conn. 29, 66 At!. 780 (1907); Benedict v. Webb,
98 N.Y. 460 (1885).
31. Blake v. Hawkins, 98 U.S. 315 (1878); Hewitt v. Green, 77 N-J. Eq.
345, 77 AtL 25 (CI. 1910).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
of the testator and destroying his scheme for the disposition of
his property. 2 Accordingly, only in the situations where the will
constitutes one testamentary scheme will the valid alternative
contingency be held void, since to do otherwise would either vio-
late the testator's intention or produce obvious injustice.
In many instances it is helpful to consider the objects of the
gift and the persons who would take in the event of total or
partial intestacy. Thus, if the void alternative contingent limi-
tation is in favor of persons who would be the testator's heirs
or next of kin, the other, valid provisions may be sustained
without substantial change in the plan of disposition intended.3"
There is a weaker case for separation if the illegal gift over is
to strangers or distant relatives, and the result of separation
would be to vest this property in the testator's heirs or next
of kin.3' It must be remembered that in these cases the general
standard prevalent throughout is the prevention of unjust dis-
tribution. Thus, even in the latter situation the court is not
defeating the presumable intent of the testator as it might if-it
declared an intestacy as to the whole and divided it according
to the statutes of distribution. In general, it may be said that
where a separation or split of contingencies will give children
or other descendants, intended to take a limited estate under a
will, that estate plus an interest in fee to their issue or sur-
vivors, most courts presume that the testator would prefer this
separability of alternative contingencies to a complete intes-
tacy.35
RULE OF SEPARABLE LIMITATIONS-
WHERE TESTATOR HAS NOT SEPARATED CONTINGENCIES
Up to now, consideration has been directed at situations
where the instrument provides for a future disposition of the
32. In the cases of Thorne v. Continental National Bank, 305 I1. App.
222, 27 N.E.2d 302 (1940); Easton v. Hall, 323 IMI. 397, 410, 154 N.E. 216,
220 (1926); and Letcher's Trustee v. Letcher, 302 Ky. 448, 194 S.W.2d
(1946), the alternative limitations were held inseparable.
33. Quinlan v. Wickman, 233 I1. 39, 84 N.E. 38 (1908); and Lawrence
v. Smith, 163 Ill. 149, 45 N.E. 259 (1896) seem to indicate the Illinois rule
is that where there is an invalid alternative limitation, if the prior estates
are given to particular heirs, their interests are separable, but if the prior
estates are given to all those who would ultimately take as heirs, there is
a complete intestacy.
34. Thompson v. Thompson, 55 How. Pr. 494 (N.Y. 1876).
35. In re Trevor, 239 N.Y. 6, 145 N.E. 66, reargument denied without
pinion, 239 N.Y. 579, 147 N.E. 203 (1924); Tiers v. Tiers, 98 N.Y. 568
(1885). Contra: In re Whitney's Estate; 176 Cal. 12, 167 Pac. 309 (1917).
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property by making alternative limitations, one of which is
invalid for remoteness of vesting and the other valid. On the
other hand, there are situations where the testator has not ex-
pressed both contingencies." In such circumstances, the English
cases that are precedents for the American decisions have re-
fused to take the next logical step forward. They will not imply
alternative contingencies even where it is evident that the tes-
tator intended such a division. Unless the division of contin-
gencies is expressly made by the donor, the gift will be al-
together invalid.37 Courts will not split the contingencies for
the testator where he did not do so himself, even though it may
well be that he contemplated such a separation.
A much cited English case on this point is Proctor -v. The
Bishop of Bath and Wells. 8 Here there was a disposition to the
first son of A who should be bred a clergyman, and if A had no
such son, then over. A never had a son, but even if one had
been born, he could have taken holy orders any time during his
life-which might well have been more than twenty-one years
after the death of A. The court recognized that the limitation
encompassed two events, namely, if no son were ever born, or
that being born, he did not take holy orders. It is apparent that
the first contingency alone would be perfectly good. The court,
however, held that it could not divide the limitation and that the
devise over was also void since it depended on the same event.
Thus, it may be seen that the rule is not based on presumed
intent but is really a question of the words used in the instru-
ment.
36. An explanation by way of example is in order here. If a testator
should devise his realty to A for life with remainder in fee to the first
son of A who should become a law professor, but if A has no such son, then
to B in fee, the gift to B would be void for remoteness, even though A died
without ever having had any son at all. B's gift would have been valid if
the testator had separated the contingencies by saying that B takes if none
of A's sons becomes a law professor or if A has no son. According to the
rule of separable limitations, the courts will not separate if the testator
fadled to do so.
37. In re Norton, 2 Ch. 27 (1911); Hancock v. Watson A.C. 14 (1902);
In re Bence, 3 Ch. 242 (1891); In re Harvey, 39 Ch. D. 289 (1888); Re
Thatcher's Trusts, 26 Beav. 365, 53 Eng. Rep. 939 (1859); Dungannon v.
Smith, 12 Cl. & Fin. 546, 8 Eng. Rep. 1523 (1845) ; Proctor v. The Bishop
of Bath and Wells, 2 BI. H. 358, 126 Eng. Rep. 594 (1794); 2 SimES, LAW
OF FuTuRE INTERESTS 392 (1st ed. 1936).
38. 2 BI. H. 358, 126 Eng. Rep. 594 (1794).
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Again, In re Hancock," a leading English case, illustrates the
principle. In this situation there was a bequest of personalty
in trust for A for life, and on her death in trust for her children
upon attaining twenty-five, if sons, or upon attaining twenty-
one, or marriage, if daughters, but in default of such issue,
then over. A died without having had a son. It was held that
the gift. over was not separable and was too remote. As Wil-
liams, L. J. declares in this case:
When a testator, having made a gift, has not divided it into
two gifts or alternative gifts, the law generally will not
do it for him merely because the contingency upon which
the gift is to take effect is, so to speak, a compound con-
tingency, capable of being divided into two events.' 0
Thus, according to the cases considered, it seems that the
English courts will not hold a gift over made in words setting
out only one event to be made into two events, although it may
consist very reasonably of two contingencies, unless the testator
has himself expressed both contingencies. Why do the courts
persist in refusing to split the contingencies when the testator
has neglected to do so? The rule has been called a purely tech-
nical one and a question of authorities. 2 Nevertheless, courts
have tried to justify the rule by assertions that the phraseology
of a will should not be altered in order to put a construction
upon it that will obviate the difficulties arising out of the rule
against perpetuities. As has been expressed in Dungannon v.
Smith,' 2 by such a mode of construction any devise that is void
for remoteness because it may take effect more than twenty-one
years beyond lives in being, although it may also take effect
within that period, may be interpreted as a devise upon the
happening of an event within the period allowed by the rule
against perpetuities. The devise would be lawful in such a case.
In fact, as has been stated, if the courts could split every con-
tingency for the purposes of applying the rule against per-
petuities,
... the only case where a contingency would be wholly bad
would be one which by its terms precluded any event except
one which necessarily would take place beyond the period
of the rule'3
39. 1 Ch. 482 (1901).
40. Id. at 495.
41. Miles v. Harford, L.R. 12 Ch. Div. 691 (1879).
42. 12 Cl. & Fin. 546, 8 Eng. Rep. 1523 (1845).
43. 2 SIMEs, op. cit. supra note 37, at 393.
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The rule that the law will not split a gift if the testator has
not himself done so was adopted early by the American courts."
Accordingly, the point was made in Gray v. Whittemore,, where-
in English authorities are discussed, that where the testator
has made a gift in words expressing only one contingency,
though depending upon a dual event or compound contingency,
the courts will not split this up into two contingencies, one good
and one bad, and sustain the limitation on the ground that the
good contingency has taken place.
A case of particular interest on this proposition is that of
In re Wilcox" where it was provided that the income from a
trust was to go to A for life, the income then to go to A's issue
during their minority and the principal to be divided among
them at their maturity, but if A died without issue who should
attain twenty-one, then over. The court held that a will cannot
be said to provide for alternative dispositions of personalty,
where the alternative is only in the sense that every gift over
may be said to be alternative-on non-occurrence of the con-
tingency on which the gift is dependent However, the inten-
tion-a fundamental factor in construing a will47 was apparent
that the contingent remainderman should take in the event that
the life tenant die without issue, as well as in the event that
she die with issue surviving who fail to attain the age of twenty-
one. This case is an excellent example of the unjustness of the
rule that courts will not imply alternative contingent limita-
tions even where it is evident that the testator intended such
division if the division into contingencies is not made by the
testator himself. In this case the invalid contingency never
occurred,48 but the court refused to recognize the valid contin-
44. Gray v. Whittemore, 192 Mass. 367, 78 N.E. 422 (1906); In re
Rong's Estate, 109 Minn. 191, 123 N.W. 471 (1909) ; In re Perkins' Estate,
245 N.Y. 478, 157 N.E. 750 (1927); In re Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 288, 87 N.E.
497 (1909).
45. 192 Mass. 367, 78 N.E. 422 (1906).
46. 194 N.Y. 288, 87 N.E. 497 (1909).
47. Lyman v. Sohier, 266 Mass. 4, 164 N.E. 460 (1929); In re Oln-
stead's Will, 131 Misc. 238, 226 N.Y. Supp. 637 (Surr. Ct. 1928).
48. The limitation over in the will on the death of all issue of A before
attaining twenty-one was invalid according to the New York statute, which
provided that a contingent limitation of a remainder in personal property
to be lawful must be such as necessarily would occur within two lives in
being at the testator's death. This limitation might suspend the absolute
ownership of personal property during lives not in being at the testator's
death.
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gency (not expressed in words) and declared the gift void. As
has been contended by Bartlett, J. in the dissenting opinion in
Re Wilcox, to refuse to give effect to the intent unless the testa-
tor has specifically made the gift over to the same person twice,
once on the death of the life tenant without issue who attain the
age of twenty-one, and again on the death of the life tenant
without issue, though the second necessarily includes the first,
is a senseless requirement involving faulty, redundant composi-
tion and wording.49 It is submitted that the rule should be that,
if a limitation void for remoteness not only in its terms logically
includes a valid limitation, but leaves it obvious as to what that
valid limitation means, and the valid limitation seems to carry
out the testator's intent, that limitation should be given effect.
EXCEPTIONS WHEREIN CONTINGENCIES ARE DIVIDED
BY THE COURT
There are a few cases which contravene the authorities hold-
ing that they will not split the contingencies where the testator
has not expressly separated them. A notable exception to the
general rule is the case of Doe d. Evers v. Chullis 0 Here there
was a devise of land to A for life, and on her death to any sons
she might have who might live to the age of twenty-three and
to any daughters who might attain twenty-one; and if A died
without leaving any sons who attained twenty-three or any
daughters who attained twenty-one, then over. A died with-
out having any children. Here there was a single expression
of two contingencies, and the gift over on one event (A's dying
without any children at all) would take effect as a true re-
mainder, while on the other (A's having neither sons who
reached twenty-three nor daughters who reached twenty-one)
as an executory devise. It was held that the gift over took effect
as a remainder on the death of A and that the vesting of the
remainder could not be voided by the invalid executory devises
in the same instrument. Thus, it may be stated that if a gift
over will take effect on one event as a contingent remainder and
on another as an executory devise, it may be valid as creating a
remainder even though it would have been an invalid executory
49. 194 N.Y. 288, 87 N.E. 497 (1909).
50. 7 H.L. Cas. 531 (1859).
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devise.51 This case can be distinguished from the case of Proctor
v. The Bishop of Bath and Wells, for in that case it was not
possible for the limitation over to operate as a remainder,52 since
there was no particular estate there that could support a re-
mainder. However, the doctrine of Evers v. Challis does not
apply to interests in personalty or equitable interests.53 "Only
where one contingency would make it a destructible interest
and the other would not is this rule of splitting contingencies
employed,5' and neither equitable interests nor interests in per-
sonalty are destructible. For the same reason, where contingent
remainders are indestructible, the doctrine would seem not to
apply.5
Few authorities in the United States have departed from the
doctrine that the court will not split contingencies where the
testator has failed to separate them expressly. Nevertheless,
in Edgerly v. Barker,-" a well-reasoned case, there was a de-
parture from the weight of authority. The testator, after
providing for his own children, provided that when the youngest
of his grandchildren, born and unborn, should arrive at the age
of forty years the residue of the estate should be theirs. The
court concluded that the invalidity of the devise to the grand-
children in that form, as violating the rule against perpetuities,
would not defeat the devise to them, but, under the doctrine of
ry pres, the estate would be allowed to vest in them when the
youngest reached the age of twenty-one years. In this case and in
cases following it, the courts seem to hold that where the specific
intention of a testator is defeated on account of the rule against
perpetuities, effect must be given to such alternative disposition
as the testator would have made, if he had known of the in-
validity of his limitation.57
51. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PEPETuITIEs § 339 (4th ed. 1942).
52. Ibid.
53. Hancock v. Watson, A.C. 14 (1902); In re Hancock, 1 Ch. 482
(1901); Re Thatcher's Trusts, 26 Beav. 365, 53 Eng. Rep. 939 (1859);
CRAY, op. cit. supra note 51, § 339.
54. 2 SIMES, op. cit. supra note 37, at 396.
55. Ibid.
56. 66 N.H. 434, 31 At!. 900 (1891).
57. Lyons v. Bradley, 168 Ala. 505, 53 So. 244 (1910); Hussey v. Sar-
gent, 116 Ky. 53, 75 S.W. 211 (1903); Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31
Atl. 900 (1891).
Washington University Open Scholarship
452 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
CONCLUSION
Often, testators, in their desire to provide for their children
and even grandchildren, include in the disposition of their
property provisions in violation of the rule against perpetuities.
This disposition often takes the form of an estate limited on
alternative contingent limitations, one within and one beyond
the period allowed by the rule against perpetuities. In such
circumstances, the courts usually split the contingencies and
uphold the valid provision while striking out the invalid one.
It the instrument is considered in its entirety, striking out the
invalid alternative limitations does not usually result in such a
destruction of the testator's testamentary scheme that valid
alternative contingent limitations may not stand. In the great
majority of cases, the legal alternative limitation may be sepa-
rated from the illegal without doing injustice to the testator's
main purpose, and his intent may thus be achieved to the extent
that the law will permit. Also, even though the testator fails
to split the alternative contingent limitations in situations where
it is evident that the testator meant such a division, the courts
should imply them. Application of the old, highly technical and
unjust rule makes for faulty, excess wording and works to defeat
the intent of testators and settlors.
IRVING M. MALNIK.
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